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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
 
A DECONSTRUCTION OF ELIE WIESEL’S THE TIME OF THE UPROOTED 
 
by 
 
Cristina T. Carbonell 
 
Florida International University, 2014 
 
Miami, Florida 
 
Professor Ana Luszczynska, Major Professor 
 
This thesis explores the implications of bearing witness as testimony, and the 
recuperation of community and identity in the wake of exile. Through a close reading of 
Elie Wiesel’s The Time of the Uprooted, alongside the theories of Jacques Derrida and 
Jean-Luc Nancy (among others), I argue that a True Testimony cannot exist, and yet 
despite this fact, there is a necessity to bear witness in the face of the Other. The 
realization suggests an imperative of a different order—one that steps back from the very 
notion of truth, to instead accept the impossibility of truth in any act of witnessing. By 
comparing Wiesel’s metaphysical framework to post-structural philosophies, I am able to 
blur the lines between an exile’s metaphysical feelings of isolation and strangeness from 
both others and themselves to the effects of recognizing and accepting that all language is 
différance. 
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Introduction 
 
In Michel Foucault’s The Archeology of Knowledge, historical analysis is 
examined by observing the vast change in approaches to the collection and organization 
of data. Foucault begins by transcribing “The old questions of the traditional analysis” 
which calls for historians to ask themselves: “What link should be made between 
disparate events? How can a casual succession be established between them? What 
continuity or overall significance do they possess? Is it possible to define a totality, or 
must one be content with reconstituting conexions [sic]?” (4). He argues that “history, in 
its traditional form, undertook to ‘memorize’ the monuments of the past, transform them 
into documents, and lend speech to those traces which, in themselves, are often not 
verbal, or which say in silence something other than what they actually say; in our time, 
history is that which transforms documents into monuments” (8).  In other words, the 
change from history’s traditional form, to a more “general history” has brought about 
several consequences resulting in a history that strays from its attempts to eradicate 
discontinuity to instead, embrace the rupture as “a basic element of historical analysis” 
(9-10). Furthermore, Foucault explores the effects of such a shift by discussing the role of 
the new historian as one which “discover[s] the limits of a process, the point of inflexion 
of a curve, the inversion of a regulatory movement, the boundaries of oscillation, the 
threshold of a function, the instant at which a circular causality breaks down,” indicating 
that the most significant change to the new history is the inclusion of the discontinuous 
into the work itself (9).  
Foucault’s approach to history is complementary to the discussion of bearing 
witness as a means of acquiring historical “truths.” Distant history, once dependent upon 
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mere artifacts and documents to transparently transcribe on behalf of first hand witnesses, 
was constructed by forcing various pieces of heterogeneous evidence into homogenous 
representations of the past. However, historiography has evolved significantly as a result 
of the role of the actual witness, able to tell the “truth” about their experiences in relation 
to monumental events. In spite of this, the multiplicity of representations that may be 
derived from a single event still proves problematic given the limitations of language, 
written or spoken, to ever consistently and completely re-present an experience or event. 
Historians are still therefore, left with the task of attempting to construct histories through 
the deconstructible and unstable event of language; even actual witnesses themselves 
struggle with the impossibility of harnessing language and words to communicate 
effectively on their behalf. That is to say, because of the limitations of language and 
words, events and experiences can never be precisely re-created, consequently 
witnessing becomes subjective to the witness. Therefore, no universal truth can ever 
prevail; truth continues to evade even the witness and that is a part of the struggle of 
reconstructing experiences and events through memory. 
Witnessing, as a form of testimony is, questioned under the notion of language’s 
unreliability as well as the complications of a witness’ own perceptions and memories. 
Because the often incompleteness of memory and the potentiality for lapses in memory as 
a result of trauma or shock memory becomes a difficult medium to present as factual. 
Nevertheless, a witness bears the closest understanding of what may have occurred in a 
given event for the mere fact that they were “present.” However, looking at witnesses’ 
accounts from the Holocaust, the notion of being present at a historical event can again be 
seen as problematic. Holocaust survivor Imre Kertész often discusses his role as the 
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stranger; as witness he is simultaneously present and absent, and thus can never fully bear 
witness to his experiences. In the article, “Life, Writing, and Problems of Genre in Elie 
Wiesel and Imre Kertész,” Michael Bachmann paraphrases Kertész’s feelings of distance 
from his role as witness: 
[I]t is impossible for a Holocaust witness—the one who has been “directly 
experiencing it”—to claim this experience without resorting to something 
which appears to be its opposite: imagination. The survivor who talks or 
writes about the Shoah is thus a stranger to him or herself, testifying on 
behalf of the “true witness”—the one who would know the experience 
directly—but is buried inside the survivor as an absence. (80) 
Bachmann’s mention of the absence can be read as a reference to the distance between 
language and fully present meaning—an abyss that can never be fully breached turning 
all witnesses into strangers. The simultaneous presence and absence, which will be 
discussed at length in the scope of my thesis, is the basis of which witnessing fails to 
present truth. For Kertész, his role as witness is shadowed by the inability of fully present 
meaning to exist; he argues that the “true witness” is lost the moment a witness tries to 
translate to the Other. But, why then does one still continue to give testimony, when 
witnessing is so often scrutinized for its inability to transcribe truth?  
To answer this question one must first understand that for the witness the act of 
giving testimony to horrific historical events is indeed an ethical imperative. To tell, 
becomes a means of not only commemorating the lives of those who did not survive, but 
also a way of re-creating events in an attempt for the memories of survivors to live on 
and never be forgotten. Another Holocaust survivor, Elie Wiesel, touches upon this 
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imperative in Evil and Exile, identifying his purpose for writing about his experiences 
during the Holocaust by saying, “We have an obligation to the dead. Their memory must 
be kept alive…Indeed, to have survived only in order to forget would be blasphemy, a 
second catastrophe. To forget the dead would be to have them die a second time” (15). 
Wiesel emphasizes the need to bear witness by suggesting that it is the only way in which 
to pass on a witnesses’ memories of an experience and recollections of the dead. To not 
do so, would in fact, be an act of murder. This ethical imperative to bear witness emerges 
as a duty to incorporate the stories of the dead within history and to prevent them from 
being misappropriated or forgotten. 
However, a witness’ imperative to tell and to narrate their experiences faces the 
paradoxical element which witnessing cannot escape, that is, its ability to conceal and 
reveal simultaneously. The paradoxical movement within all witnessing though, does not 
suggest that the witnesses’ account should be seen as less true, but instead unveils the 
event of language as a deconstructible medium that necessarily and simultaneously 
conceals and reveals.  Although the paradox is often viewed as problematic, critical 
historian Hayden White argues, “So natural is the impulse to narrate, so inevitable is the 
form of narrative for any report on the way things really happened, that narrativity could 
appear problematical only in a culture in which it was absent…” (1). White disqualifies 
the problem that arises when one event is burdened with an array of representations by 
saying, “Far from being a problem…narrative might well be considered a solution to a 
problem of general human concern, namely the problem of how to translate knowing into 
telling…” (1). Although White’s focus is on narrative witness accounts, it serves our 
purposes by illustrating the benefits that this type of witnessing reveals. Through the lens 
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of a narrative, witnessing may become further disconnected from “Truth,” yet allows for 
an understanding of events that ruptures the limited frame, which History can present. 
Capital “T” truth suggests that histories can be developed as a verifiable set of factual 
events, however, what my analysis aims to explore is that Truth is inaccessible through 
witnessing or by any other means for that matter, yet this revelation allows for a closer 
understanding of history than any “Truth” can. In other words, we need to rethink the 
meaning of Truth and History. 
Despite the paradox of witnessing, the use of witness narratives in the collection 
and representation of histories allows for a more nuanced view of historical events from 
the perspectives of the victims.  In considering how histories are acquired, transcribed, 
and taught to new generations, historical events are almost always taught in a way that 
dismisses the individual victim, instead focusing on the oppressors or the events that can 
summate the reasons for victimization. Historians and witnesses alike often allude to the 
disproportion of History. With regard to the fragmented history of the Holocaust, Elie 
Wiesel states, “To know the real story of their [victims] deaths, we would need to know 
the individual death of each one of them. And we do not” (Afterword 160).  Furthermore, 
Saidiya Hartman’s “Venus in Two Acts” critiques the effect of historical generalization 
by discussing the archive of slavery and the presence of Venus as “an emblematic figure 
of the enslaved woman” to suggest that what is missing from history is the story of the 
victims (Abstract). She argues, “[T]he stories that exist are not about them [victims], but 
rather about the violence, excess, mendacity, and reason that seized hold of their lives, 
transformed them into commodities and corpses, and identified them with names tossed-
off as insults and crass jokes” (2). In other words, although History with a capital “H” 
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implies an unbiased account of the events that occurred during a specific time and place, 
Wiesel and Hartman’s claims signify the flaw in Historical depictions and proves that 
individual witness accounts can lead to a better understanding of History, while 
simultaneously accepting the impossibility of a unified Historical Truth. 
Additionally, analyzing the perceptions of historians and the changes in notions of 
history through time emphasizes the importance of integrating individual witness 
accounts of historical events into History. Jane Tompkins discusses the fallibility of 
History in her critical essay “Indians,” in which she traces how cultural beliefs, values 
and opinions affect historical documentation of Native Americans. Tompkins concludes 
“The historian can never escape the limitations of his or her own position in history and 
so inevitably gives an account that is an extension of the circumstances from which it 
springs” (685). Tompkins’ statement holds true for witnesses as well. Although 
presenting valuable insight into the minds of victims, witnesses too must contend with the 
limits of position, location and perception. However, the acceptance of these limits 
situates witnessing as a form of ethical initiative to re-present as re-telling and therein 
keep alive the experiences from the perspectives of the victims, as opposed to 
documenting and presenting facts to be used as History. Even though unable to fully bear 
witness, those who can tell the stories often left out of History feel obligated to do so, 
regardless of the difficulties, impossibilities, and limitations of language to give “true” 
testimony or a “real” re-presentation.  
My thesis will explore the limitations, advantages, and ethical implications of 
witnessing as testimony through language. With a focus on the difficulties presented by 
language to translate experience and memory, we will look at the role of the historical 
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narrative, often disguised as fiction, as it attempts to bear witness to historical atrocities 
as an ethical imperative through the mind of a character acting as witness. Specifically, in 
looking at the writing of Elie Wiesel, who continually discusses the paradoxical qualities 
of witnessing in his memoirs and fiction, we will dissect the formidable medium of 
language as a limited means of transcribing Truth, while unveiling the complexities of the 
relationship between bearing witness and testimony.  
The present thesis will primarily focus on Wiesel’s fictional novel, The Time of 
the Uprooted, which grapples with the limitations of language in this sense. Although 
presented as fiction, the novel deals with historical events, and through his characters 
Wiesel continues to bear witness to his own memories and feelings of exile. The novel is 
organized through memories and flashbacks, and thematizes the impossibility of 
language to give “True testimony” as Jacques Derrida, in his seminal Sovereignties in 
Question, defines it. Although the novel’s main character, Gamaliel, acknowledges the 
incapability of language to fully capture Truth, he continues to tell his story nevertheless. 
In so doing, Wiesel’s character tells his stories as an obligation to remember, to construct 
his unique history in relation to History and to reveal and conceal simultaneously the 
horrors of his past. Contemporary continental philosopher David Wood describes this 
obligation as “our continuing debt to the unthematized” emphasizing the unspoken 
responsibility to acknowledge that which is radically impossible to explain (2). In an 
attempt to extend this debt, I will explore how Wiesel’s novel acknowledges this 
obligation to bear witness while simultaneously and paradoxically presenting the silence 
found in language, the trace concealed in all witnessing and the unmistakable obligation 
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to the Other as a means of establishing a collective memory to an event that can never be 
fully explained, understood or re-presented. 
 Chapter one will discuss Elie Wiesel’s acknowledgement of language’s 
limitations in his writing by discussing the silence, or secret always present in language. 
Using Jacques Derrida’s theory of the secret and Wiesel’s own understanding of the 
silence found in language, chapter one will determine how Gamaliel, the main character 
in the novel, fulfills his obligation under the burden of silence. Wiesel defines silence as 
the loss of meaning through the medium of language, which the Other will never know, 
or understand. In an essay titled, “To Believe or Not to Believe” From the Kingdom of 
Memory, Wiesel explains, “Our [survivors] memories are those of madmen. How can we 
get the doors to open? What can we do to share our visions? Our words can only evoke 
the incomprehensible. Hunger, thirst, fear, humiliation, waiting, death; for us these words 
hold different realities. This is the ultimate tragedy of the victims” (33). The tragedy of 
language, or its impossibility to fully bear witness, plays a vital role in The Time of the 
Uprooted. In the wake of these difficulties presented by language, Gamaliel continues to 
narrate, to tell, to bear witness to his experiences and feelings in an effort to transcribe a 
history that should not be forgotten. 
Chapter two will discuss Gamaliel’s drive to recuperate a loss sense of 
“community” and “identity” through bearing witness. Community, in a metaphysical 
sense, will be hypothesized as false under the theories of Jean-Luc Nancy and Ian James 
who argue that community begins at the primordial level and thus cannot be lost as such. 
Gamaliel’s imperative to bear witness and his acceptance of the incompleteness of 
testimony will be used to question the ethical imperative to tell and where the imperative 
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to do so comes from. Wiesel’s belief that bearing witness is an obligation and a duty to 
those who did not survive the Holocaust will be analyzed alongside his feelings of 
language’s incompleteness. These paradoxical elements (the need to bear witness, while 
understating the limitations of language) work to reveal the need for the Other, and the 
need for the acceptance of finitude. Chapter two will pay close attention to the role of 
storyteller, and the medium of language, which always conceals and reveals 
simultaneously. The acceptance of Derrida’s term, différance, which implies that 
language is already differing and deferring from what it aims to explain, suggests that all 
language is finite. Thus, chapter two will analyze Gamaliel’s act of bearing witness, 
which alludes to this lag of meaning, as an acceptance of language’s finitude.  
The final chapter and conclusion will explore the purpose of witnessing by posing 
various questions regarding the effects of bearing witness on history and the witnesses 
themselves. Wiesel often discusses his purpose for writing as his way of paying a debt to 
those victims who did not survive. He argues that by telling, he is fulfilling his obligation 
to History and to a community that needs to remember the past in order to avoid 
repeating it. Since witnessing cannot be seen as “True Testimony” because of language’s 
limits and the multiplicity of accounts detailing the same event, one may ask what other 
purpose does bearing witness serve? In writing The Time of the Uprooted, Wiesel 
emphasizes how bearing witness helps both the witness and the collective to which that 
individual belongs, yielding a healing which constructs a shared identity and a collective 
memory of a historical event. However, through a demystification of the metaphysical 
sense of “identity” and “community,” can bearing witness still serve a purpose, and if so 
can the use of testimony which can never be “true” still add to our understanding of 
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history? My concluding chapter will try to unravel these questions through an 
examination of how witnessing can serve as an expansion to historical “truths.” The 
extension beyond “truth,” explored in the novel through Gamaliel’s “responsible” 
witnessing, emphasizes that all language, and thus all witnessing read as a response to the 
Other, unveils the connection between all beings while adding to our understanding of a 
historical event. 
Through a deconstructive reading of The Time of the Uprooted, Wiesel’s poetic 
language and secrets emerge as traces or différance, which “affirm[ing] the necessity of 
ambiguity, incompleteness, repetition, negotiation, and contingency,” arrive at a telling 
that is more than simply true and meaningful, but instead reveal the impossibility of 
language to exist without world, without being (Wood 4). Derrida asserts that “what 
matters is not what the…[text] means, or that it bear witness to this or that […] what 
matters most is the strange limit between what can and cannot be determined or decided” 
(Derrida, Poetics 69-70). Derrida’s emphasis on the limit and excess of language 
explicates that however close one may come to articulating their memories or 
experiences, what matters is not the Truth, but the boundaries of language and the act of 
bearing witness; this does not however suggest a limitation, quite conversely it opens the 
possibility for myriad interpretations and subsequent reinterpretations, which the theory 
of deconstruction identifies as the inevitability of having to live in language. By 
acknowledging the limit and corresponding opening, and through close textual analysis, 
we can explore the nature of the secret to further understand the relationship between 
bearing witness and our obligation to that which we cannot reach or name; the 
unknowable, the unnameable, and the unthematizable.  
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Chapter I: The Secret 
“We all knew that we could never say what had to be said, that we could never express in 
words—our experience of madness on an absolute scale…All words seemed inadequate, 
worn, foolish, lifeless, whereas I wanted them to sear” (Wiesel “Why I Write” 14).  
 
In his essay, “The Poetics and Politics of Witnessing” from Sovereignties in 
Question, Jacques Derrida discusses the secret as the paradoxical aporetic experience of 
all witnessing. He argues that witnessing is bound by the impossibility of “truth,” because 
the secret is paradoxically present in all language.  To unravel Derrida’s notion of 
witnessing we must first explore the theories of Ferdinand de Saussure who understood 
language as a “system of interdependent terms in which the value of each term results 
solely from the simultaneous presence of the others” (Course 858). Saussure implies that 
a sign, which is composed of a signifier (the spoken or written word) and signified (the 
concept or idea that comes to mind), derives its accepted meaning from what it is not. 
Because the signifier and signified do not possess any natural connection to one another, 
Saussure argues that, “in language there are only differences without positive terms,” 
suggesting that prior to their association “neither ideas nor sounds …existed before the 
linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the 
system,” thus it is the sign’s difference to other signs that gives it its “meaning” (Course 
862). Using the theory of signification as the basis of our understanding of language, 
Derrida argues that the lag between a sign and the signifier of that sign creates a gap 
within meaning itself. Derrida calls this lag différance and argues that the space carried in 
meaning is at the very basis of language. In her introduction to Derrida’s Dissemination, 
Barbara Johnson simplifies différance further, suggesting “[t]he very fact that a word is 
divided into a phonic signifier and a mental signified, and that, as Saussure pointed out, 
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language is a system of differences rather than a collection of independently meaningful 
units, indicates that language as such is already constituted by the very distances and 
differences it seeks to overcome” (ix). In other words, because language is divided as 
demonstrated by the concept of signification, a space between meaning and the word 
itself already exists. Each word along with its “meaning” carries a trace of what it is not. 
Therefore, “As soon as there is meaning, there is difference” (ix). In witnessing then (as 
in all forms of signification), it becomes radically impossible to create or reveal “truth” 
since all language is continually differing from its corresponding meaning. Derrida 
discusses witnessing as paradoxical by alluding to the radical impossibility for any act of 
communication to have a complete and certifiable meaning, because the secret (that 
which is undisclosed in the process of signification) is untranslatable, and thus always 
carried in language.  
  However, Derrida also asserts that what matters is not the “meaning” but “the 
limit between what can and cannot be determined or decided” (Poetics 70). In terms of 
bearing witness as testimony, Derrida disproves the possibility of a “True Testimony,” 
insofar as “True” signifies a verifiable and indisputable account of an event. 
Nevertheless, Derrida emphasizes that what is important is the interaction and movement 
between the teller and the listener and the ambiguous limits that the story creates. The 
realization that a “True Testimony” cannot exist, does not suggest a loss of value. 
Instead, Derrida argues that testimony “cannot, it must not, be absolutely certain in the 
order of knowing as such. This paradox of as such is the paradox we can experience” 
(Poetics 68). In other words, fully knowing, or ‘knowing as such’, is not in the order of 
witnessing because it is impossible to be absolutely certain due to différance. Although, 
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the secret carried as a trace in language confirms that a “True Testimony” cannot exist, it 
is the limit between what we can and cannot know which creates an opening and allows 
for a myriad of possibilities and interpretations.  
Holocaust survivor and author Elie Wiesel thematizes the silence and secrecy of 
language in many of his works. He, like so many others who bear witness to the events of 
the Holocaust, struggles with language’s ability to reveal the traumatic experiences of the 
victims in a way that will enlighten others to the brutal realities of the event. Wiesel 
comments often on the impossibility of this feat. For Wiesel, language is a barrier and not 
a vehicle to reveal truth. In an essay titled, “Why I Write” From the Kingdom of Memory, 
Wiesel explains, “No I do not understand. And if I write, it is to warn the reader that he 
will not understand either. ‘You will not understand, you will never understand,’ were the 
words heard everywhere in the kingdom of night. I can only echo them” (18). For the 
purpose of my argument, admittedly rendered metaphorically, Wiesel’s suggestion that 
he and those who will become the addressees of his witnessing, can never and will never 
“understand” reveals the paradox of language: although language reveals, it 
simultaneously conceals. Wiesel believes language can never transcribe the events of the 
Holocaust, insofar as language fails to re-present an event in a way that can re-create the 
experience of the event. The realization of language’s incompleteness works to rupture 
the possibility of a True Testimony—a provable, and verifiable testimony—and instead 
suggests that all witnessing carries a secret that cannot be shared. The secret for Wiesel, 
the impossibility of re-creating a traumatic, destructive, and unbelievable event through 
words, begs the question: How can language ever explain or reveal the Holocaust? This 
question, a theme in many of Wiesel’s works, confirms his acknowledgment of the 
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incompleteness of testimony. By exposing the lack of fully present meaning in the act of 
bearing witness, especially when used as testimony to the events of the Holocaust and 
experiences of exile, Wiesel reveals the secret beneath all witnessing—there is silence in 
language.  
To begin it is essential to distinguish between Wiesel’s metaphysical framework 
and Jacques Derrida’s who deconstructs the very notion of “meaning” and “ground,” 
which is to say metaphysics itself.  For Wiesel, the secret represents the tragedy of 
knowing, yet being unable to reveal all. He emphasizes the limitations of language and 
the obstacles that a witness who seeks to recreate and retell for the sake of history and for 
the sake of “truth” faces. Wiesel’s desire for metaphysical “truth” and transparency still 
acknowledges the paradox of language, but for him, the impossibility of revealing the 
secret is a torment and hurdle to continue to strive to overcome. Furthermore, Wiesel 
primarily deals with bearing witness as testimony, and thus, his focus is on the absence of 
fully present meaning, and his inabilities to ever fully reveal his experiences for the sake 
of history. However, for Derrida, who does not seek truth but instead deconstructs the 
very possibility of truth, and for that matter, transparency, bearing witness is glorified in 
that it is unable to transcribe. Derrida understands that all language carries a trace of what 
it is not, which negates the possibility of there ever being a transcription of meaning or 
that which does not carry a secret. But Derrida does not see this as a problem; instead he 
identifies this lag in meaning as a necessity and a possibility at the heart of meaning and 
being. The secret then becomes an opening—an allowance of interpretation and different 
modes of perception—that must be accepted and embraced. In “Poetics and Politics of 
Witnessing,” Derrida traces the deconstruction of presence in a poem by Holocaust 
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survivor Paul Celan, that speaks about the “irreplaceability of the singular witness” and 
the untranslatable nature of language (67). In discussing the difficulty of translation, 
Derrida metaphorically unravels the first line of the poem, ‘Aschenglorie,’ to suggest how 
the secret should be revered: 
Ash is the figure of annihilation without remainder, without memory, or 
without a readable or decipherable archive. Perhaps that would lead us to 
think of this fearful thing: the possibility of annihilation, the virtual 
disappearance of the witness, but… ashes are also of glory, they can still 
be renowned and renamed, sung, blessed, loved, if the glory of the 
renowned and renamed is not reducible either to fire or to the light of 
knowing. The brightness of glory is not only the light of knowing 
[connaissance] and not necessarily the clarity of knowledge [savior]. 
(Poetics 68-69) 
What Derrida implies here is that there is glory in not knowing, if only one embraces the 
impossibility of knowing while simultaneously accepting that there is no other way 
except to bear witness. Derrida argues “the brightness of glory” is being unable to know 
fully. With this understanding, bearing witness to the events of the Holocaust can work to 
glorify, and in a way, honor the memories and experiences that can never be shared 
completely. Although Wiesel’s metaphysical framework, which prompts his desire for 
“wholeness” and “transparency,” limits his views of the positive aspects of what cannot 
be transferred through the act of witnessing, for our purposes, his acceptance of the 
incompleteness of testimony works alongside the theories of Derrida to reveal the 
difficulties of the witness, and the complexities of language.   
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 To delve even further into the problems of using a witness account as testimony, 
which claims to be “true,” it is vital to understand the layers of différance, which occur at 
the moment of witnessing. Derrida discusses the addressee of any given testimony, “the 
witness of the witness,” and asserts that because the addressee did not see what the 
witness (the first witness) saw, they will never be able to see it (Poetics 76). The “non-
access of the addressee to the object of the testimony is what marks the ab-sence of the 
‘witness of the witness’ to the thing itself” (76). In other words, another gap is created 
between the witness who testifies and the witness who is the addressee of the testimony 
because of their different access to the experiences. But, Derrida asserts, “This ab-sence 
is essential. It is connected to the speech or the mark of testimony to the extent that 
speech can be disassociated from what it is witness to…” (76). Derrida’s emphasis on the 
ab-sence indicates that even at the moment of witnessing, due to the individual, the 
witnesses themselves are not “present,” because a being is never “present” to their 
experiences. In other words, there is already a gap between the event and the witness who 
experienced the event. Although a witness may have been “present” at an event, when 
they bear witness to that event, they are no longer present and even when they are 
“present,” they are not “present.” Therefore, because memories are a product of language, 
our own are marked by an ab-sence or by différance, and thus can never be “present” as 
such.  
 Wiesel, who often discusses his move to fiction as a means of “protect[ing] the 
silent universe which is [his],” recognizes the ‘ab-sence’, which Derrida paradoxically 
reveals. For Wiesel, bearing witness to his personal experiences of the Holocaust is an 
ethical imperative derived from his desire to ensure that the event is not forgotten or 
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repeated, and that the lives lost were not completely in vain. Therefore, his “presence” is 
of great importance. However, Wiesel has distanced himself from memoir writing, to 
instead bear witness through the stories of others. His move stems from his realization 
that words “signify absence. And lack” (qtd. in Davis 28). Wiesel is significantly aware 
of the impossibility of providing a “True Testimony” and he associates this “problem” 
with language: “Sometimes I use words. Against my will. Words separate me from 
myself” (ibid.).  Here, Wiesel acknowledges the space between the witness and the event 
witnessed by alluding to the separation intrinsic to language and being. Even at the 
moment of comprehension, when Wiesel attempts to translate what he saw into thoughts, 
constituted by words, to potentially brandish his memories with the horrific events, his 
“presence” is joined by an absence. In other words, because language creates difference 
and we are bound to world through language, we can never separate the two—leaving us 
always seeking for the right word, the right way to explain, yet knowing that there will 
never be one. 
 In Elie Wiesel’s Secretive Text, Colin Davis argues that “Wiesel, particularly in 
his later fiction, adopts an aesthetics of secrecy rather than revelation” and that “Wiesel’s 
texts are not the mystical silences that point to a truth beyond language, but the gaps that 
indicate the absence of fully retrievable meaning” (7). Here, Davis intones a reading of 
Wiesel’s fiction that goes beyond the search for metaphysical “truth” but instead 
identifies with Derrida’s theories of language.  By suggesting that Wiesel “adopts an 
aesthetic of secrecy”, he alludes to Wiesel’s reluctance to claim that his writing can 
reveal the events of the Holocaust. Davis goes on to quote Wiesel who says, Auschwitz 
signifies “‘the defeat of the intellect that wants to find a Meaning—with a capital—to 
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history’” (qtd. in Davis 30). In other words, Wiesel argues that an event of such tragic 
proportions, such as the Holocaust, can have no clear “meaning.” Although Wiesel does 
not address the lack of meaning in all language, nor does he support the nonexistence of 
final signifiers that is necessary in a philosophical reading that surpasses the 
metaphysical, his commentary on the absence of meaning ties in well with my reading.  
Wiesel is particularly aware of the tension between the need to bear witness to the 
Holocaust, and the impossibility of re-vealing the event of the Holocaust. This is perhaps 
why Wiesel continues to tell his stories under the label of fiction. Davis clarifies Wiesel’s 
reluctance to engage in writing labeled as memoir or non-fiction: 
The witness asks for belief, even if understanding is impossible; the 
storyteller encourages interpretation. In his fiction Wiesel establishes 
himself principally as storyteller rather than witness…Fiction offers 
Wiesel a medium through which he can avoid talking about his own 
experiences. In fact, the choice of literature as a means of expression is 
directly related to the refusal to describe Auschwitz, since Wiesel himself 
argues—Auschwitz can have no place in literature (48-49). 
Davis proposes that although Wiesel continues to tell stories of imaginary lives, stories 
that could have happened, Wiesel is able to fulfill his obligation as a witness, yet avoid 
the scrutiny which non-fiction attracts. In his fiction, Wiesel addresses the many 
challenges of bearing witness as testimony. His characters often reflect the sorrow and 
emptiness that a witness cannot seem to project or explain through language, allowing for 
a reading that unveils the problematic nature of language to ever give “True Testimony,” 
and to ever create a verifiable History of the past. 
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*** 
One such project of fiction is Wiesel’s novel, The Time of the Uprooted. The 
novel is centered on the life of Gamaliel Friedman, a Jewish survivor of the Holocaust. 
When Gamaliel is just a boy, his mother entrusts a Christian cabaret singer, IIonka, to 
protect him from the inevitable fate many Jewish men, women, and children suffered. His 
mother’s efforts were not in vain. Although he suffered the loss of his parents, who he 
never saw again, he survived into adulthood. However, Gamaliel’s life is marked by his 
feelings of displacement. He works as a ghostwriter, writing his stories under the names 
of others while simultaneously composing his own book, The Book of Secrets, a project 
titled to reflect Gamaliel’s feelings of distance and isolation from his own existence. He 
surrounds himself with four stateless and displaced friends with whom he creates a 
fraternal community, yet he never feels at home anywhere. Throughout his life Gamaliel 
suffers three failed relationships: the first of which ends in mystery, the second, which 
makes him a widower and the father of twin girls who grow to despise him, and the last, 
which marks him a cuckold. When the novel opens Gamaliel has been called to a hospital 
to identify a Hungarian woman that may be his mother, or his long lost caretaker IIonka. 
Through the course of two days, Gamaliel bears witness to his past torments in order to 
try to understand how he came to be an old man with so little, yet heavy with so much.  
Wiesel’s novel thematizes the struggle to arrive at Truth, and works to explicate 
the problems with using witnessing as a vehicle to “True Testimony.” However, the 
novel is set in a metaphysical framework that glorifies “truth,” and “wholeness.” 
Gamaliel often complains of a desire to fill the void inside himself, a void caused by his 
separation from his family, his country, and even from his name which he had to change 
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temporarily to Peter in order to protect himself.  In spite of these metaphysical longings, 
through the course of the novel, the reader becomes aware of Gamaliel’s development 
and enlightenment. Although at the start of the novel Gamaliel’s focus is on what he 
believes he has lost (his “identity” and “home”), his feelings of estrangement and 
displacement eventually lead him to the realization that “truth” is ambiguous. While 
Gamaliel is undoubtedly searching for “truth” and “meaning” in a metaphysical sense, he 
comes to understand that “he could no longer look at it [his past] with enough detachment 
to tell what was true and what wasn’t” (Time 289). Through the realization of his 
uncertainty, Gamaliel arrives at the only “truth” he cannot escape, “everything that 
happens in our human universe is mysteriously linked to everything else,” suggesting and 
acknowledging the need for Others and the connection between language and existence 
itself (32). Wiesel seems to use Gamaliel to suggest the complexities of witnessing. 
Gamaliel struggles with the paradoxical qualities of bearing witness—although language 
can never reveal truth, which is always simultaneously concealing and revealing, it is the 
only means to bear witness. For survivors of the Holocaust then, who feel an ethical 
imperative to bear witness for the honor of the victims and for the sake of history, the act 
of bearing witness as bearing witness is necessary, yet unable to provide truth. Therefore, 
the question becomes not, how can we find truth? But instead, how can we step away 
from the notion of truth?   
    This metaphysical framework which calls for “truth” is deconstructed in David 
Wood’s The Step Back: Ethics and Politics after Deconstruction. In his introduction, 
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Wood clarifies what he means by the step back by alluding to Keats’1 letter, addressed to 
his brothers, where he declares, “Negative Capability, that is, when man is capable of 
being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and 
reason” (1). In other words, ‘Negative Capability’ is the acceptance and lack of desire to 
change our ambiguous relationship to the world and existence. Wood’s use of the phrase 
“the step back” therefore, aims to focus our attentions on “the space of possibility within 
which our practical engagement of world takes place” instead of becoming preoccupied 
with acquiring certainty (5). He argues that we must recognize “our continued debt to the 
unthematized” and step back from the notion of “truth” and metaphysics (2). Wood’s 
concept of infinite debt allows for readers to deconstruct the concept of “truth,” to reveal 
“further possibilities both of constructing meaning, and of acknowledging the 
incompleteness of the narratives with which we provide ourselves” (5). Wiesel’s novel 
read through this lens dispels the notion of meaning and of testimony as “truth” and 
instead opens the possibilities of interpretation. Through a deconstructive reading of The 
Time of the Uprooted, Wiesel’s poetic language “affirms the necessity of ambiguity, 
incompleteness, repetition, negotiation and contingency,” to arrive at a telling that is 
more than simply “true” and “meaningful” but instead acknowledges the limits and 
possibilities of language to shape our understating of world (Wood 4).    
To begin a deconstruction of Wiesel’s novel it is essential to understand the 
motives of such a reading. To deconstruct does not imply destruction nor does it signify a 
radical loss of meaning. Barbara Johnson attempts to clarify the intention of 
deconstruction by suggesting that a close synonym to the word is ‘“analysis,’ which 
                                                        
1 John Keats (1795-1821) English Romantic poet  
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etymologically means ‘to undo’” (xiv).  Johnson goes on to say, “if anything is destroyed 
in a deconstructive reading, it is not meaning but the claim to unequivocal domination of 
one mode of signifying over another” (xiv). Therefore, in the process of deconstructing 
Wiesel’s The Time of the Uprooted, the goal is not to disqualify or destroy the text’s 
“meaning” or importance, but instead to reveal its theme of the ambiguity of memory and 
witnessing in order to open the possibilities of constructing meaning with the 
understanding of its incompleteness therein emphasizing the potential glory in this 
ambiguity.  
Coincidently, The Time of the Uprooted begins with a memory that emphasizes 
the estrangement between witnessing and  “truth”. A stranger is at the door, and Gamaliel 
is four years old. The novel, which is narrated in non-chronological order, is framed by 
the presence of this stranger. The stranger is used both as a representation of the madness 
a witness feels when trying to transfer their experiences through language to oneself and 
to another other, and as a type of anchor, or mentor to Gamaliel in his struggle to let go of 
the possibility of ever finding “truth.”  Gamaliel comments on his love of “madmen” by 
saying, “It’s not the madness itself I love, but those it possess…as if to show them the 
limits of their possibilities—and then makes them determined to go further, to push 
themselves beyond those limits” (Time 4). Here, Gamaliel seems to be embracing the 
limitations as well as the possibilities of going beyond the notion of “truth.” Additionally, 
this stranger who Gamaliel meets at four years old, can be read as a metaphorical 
representation of all witnesses, and for the sake of our argument, as Gamaliel himself 
because there is always strangeness when there is différance and Other. Although the 
novel is outlined by the presence of a stranger, a madman who shows up at various stages 
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of the fragmented story and appears specifically at the beginning and ending of the novel, 
the true stranger in the novel is Gamaliel (the witness); he who is a stranger to himself, 
and to all others. The strangeness Gamaliel feels implies the separation between an act of 
witnessing and the witness, as well as the separation between the witness and the 
addressee. This reading can be inferred when Gamaliel opens the door to the stranger 
who is thirsty and hungry not for food and drink, but for the telling and says “I want 
words and I want faces…I travel the world looking for people’s stories” (4). Read 
through a metaphorical lens, the stranger searches for the stories of others because he 
cannot find “truth” in his own story. Therefore, placing an emphasis on the telling and 
not the “truth” of the story, and further emphasizing the importance of the story over the 
“truth.”  Similarly, Gamaliel who is a ghostwriter also writes the stories of others in the 
frame of the novel, as does Wiesel himself, who argues that, “In order to protect the silent 
universe which is mine, I recount that of others…” (Davis 27). The layering of 
storytelling reveals a constant deferral, which occurs at the moment of witnessing, and in 
the act of bearing witness. It also acknowledges the silence carried in language. Shortly 
after telling the reader of his encounter with the stranger, Gamaliel declares that man is 
“just the restless and mysterious shadow of a dream” (5). The shadow can be read as an 
indication of the secret and the cause of witnesses’ feelings of isolation from their own 
memories. In other words, the witness who is “present” is haunted by the shadow of an 
absence caused by language’s différance.  The witness, then, can never reveal all, and 
thus, is always a stranger to his or her own witnessing. 
As previously discussed, Derrida similarly describes the witness as a stranger, or 
an absent presence, suggesting “the witness is not present either, of course, presently 
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present, to what he recalls, he is not present to it in the mode of perception, to the extent 
that he bears witness, at the moment when he bears witness he is no longer present, now 
to what he says he was present to, to what he says he perceived…” (Poetics 76). What 
Derrida conveys here is that a witness can no longer be thought of as “present” to an 
event, which he is recalling at a later time, but rather because of the différance in 
language, the witness is simultaneously absent and present from the moment of 
witnessing. The moment a witness translates the visual image of his experience into 
words (which is the only way to have an experience), he carries an absence along with his 
presence. In other words, the “present” experience itself is both present and absent. 
Therefore, when Gamaliel experiences and bears witness to his memories, he himself is 
already absent from his own witnessing, first, by no longer being physically present to the 
event he hopes to re-present and second, through the différance in language which creates 
a gap in meaning that can never be closed and is always already present. In other words, 
from the moment of witnessing, Gamaliel is never fully present; to be fully present is 
impossible.  Thus, as Gamaliel recounts various memories of his past, his memories of 
his uprootedness and his last encounter with his parents before their separation, the 
reader, or addressee, as well as he himself to some degree, is asked to believe that these 
events occurred and Gamaliel is recounting them as they “truly” happened. Derrida 
argues: 
Whoever bears witness [in English in the original] does not provide proof; 
he is someone whose experience, in principle singular and irreplaceable 
(even if it can be cross-checked with others in order to become proof, in 
order to become probative in a verification process) attest, precisely, that 
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some “thing” has been present to him. This “thing” is no longer present to 
him, of course, in the mode of perception at the moment when the 
attestation takes place; but it is present to him, if he alleges this presence, 
as presently re-presented in memory. (Poetics 77) 
For Derrida, the witness can never be fully present because of his or her own perception 
of an event, which through language, causes “truth” to be impossible. However, he also 
mentions a witnesses’ alleged witnessing as “present to him” indicating that for a witness, 
who by saying they were present at an event is in fact pleading for belief, bears witness as 
a way to re-present his memories as he understands them to be true. Therefore, although 
Gamaliel bears witness to his perception of truth, he is still, in some sense, a stranger to 
his own witnessing. Gamaliel’s story, which is told through flashbacks, can then be 
interpreted as re-presented memories that promise to be true. However, Gamaliel’s 
witnessing presents the “secret as secret” insofar as he addresses the absence he feels by 
continuously addressing the impossibility to find the right word (Poetics 68). 
Consequently, Wiesel’s novel addresses the limits of language to reveal truth and the 
inevitable presentation of the secret as secret, or the absence that is simultaneously 
revealed when a witness claims they were present at an event.  
The narrator of the novel describes Gamaliel as “the eternal stranger protecting 
his secret” and later proclaims, “Let us note here that Gamaliel [is] the stranger in the 
story” (11-12). However, the narrator is suggesting that Gamaliel is a stranger in a 
metaphysical sense because of his status as a refugee. He explains,  “It is said that a man 
never recovers from torture, that a woman never recovers from rape. The same is true of 
those who have been uprooted: once a refugee, always a refugee. He escapes from one 
  
 
26
place of exile only to find himself in another: Nowhere is he at home…his life is always 
provisional” (12). What is important to note here, is that in a Derridian sense, Gamaliel, 
like all witnesses and therefore all beings, is a stranger before he is a refugee. Because 
language is already differing and deferring at the moment of its inception, we too are 
differing and deferring, and thus are “strangers” or “refugees” from ourselves as well as 
to all others the moment we come into being. However, this does not suggest that 
Gamaliel’s feelings are any less valuable.  After all, it is our perceptions that create our 
understanding of world. But for our purposes, Gamaliel’s role as “stranger” in the frame 
of the novel can be read beyond a metaphysical understanding to show the estrangement 
of all witnesses.     
Furthermore, Gamaliel’s metaphorical role as stranger draws parallel with his 
profession as a ghostwriter within the novel. Writing the stories of others without much 
effort, yet struggling to write his own story, Gamaliel’s profession mirrors his own role as 
witness. When analyzed further as “the eternal stranger protecting his secret,” his 
profession as a ghostwriter becomes even more significant to explicate his role as witness 
(Wiesel, Time 11). As a ghostwriter, he is able to write leisurely, while keeping silent. 
That is, by writing the stories of others who pay him for his craft, he is able to detach 
himself from the very idea of “truth” to instead bear witness to his emotions and 
perceptions without the scrutiny or criticism which writers of non-fiction are subjected to. 
By embracing his role as stranger, his secret torments remain embedded in his writing, 
yet distant from what he discloses by means of using characters and the names of others 
as author. After being called dishonest by his girlfriend Eve, who questions “Aren’t you 
deceiving the reader when you write a book that has someone else’s name on it as author? 
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Aren’t you lying to him?” Gamaliel responds, “[I]n my heart of hearts, I’m still a refugee. 
And maybe my words are also refugees, and that’s why they hide in other people’s 
books” (217-218). Gamaliel’s acknowledgement of words’ capacity to be “refugees” 
recalls Wiesel’s own description of language in Davis’ Secretive Texts: “Sometimes it 
seems to me that I speak of other things in the sole aim of keeping silent about the 
essential: lived experience” (qtd. in Secretive Texts 27). Wiesel is metaphorically a 
ghostwriter himself. Although he continues to write, he avoids writing works labeled as 
“truth” to instead write stories. His fiction, juxtaposed to Gamaliel’s stories published 
under the names of others, reminds readers that like Wiesel, Gamaliel accepts the 
secretive nature of language. In a metaphysical sense, Gamaliel’s words have become 
displaced, unable to find a home, and ultimately unable to tell and produce a meaning 
that will sufficiently reveal all. However, Gamaliel’s realization intones that language is 
différance, a deferral and a difference from what it desires to reveal. When Gamaliel 
recalls the words of a friend and mentor, Rebbe Zusya, who says ‘“When words lose their 
way, when they wander off and lose their meaning, when they become lies…those who 
speak or write them are the most uprooted of people. And surely the most to be pitied’” 
(Wiesel, Time 227), he reminds himself that language, like people, can be exiled, can be 
refugees.  Beyond the metaphysical, the Rebbe’s words can be read to show that language 
is always in exile from what it bears witness to. As such, language, which carries a secret, 
is always lost from fully present meaning. With this understanding, Gamaliel’s role as 
ghostwriter suggests his acknowledgement of “exiled” language: always separated, 
differing and deferring from its intended meaning.  
  
 
28
To further emphasize Gamaliel’s relationship to language and his acceptance of 
the secret carried in language, Gamaliel names the book he is writing alongside his 
ghostwriting duties, The Book of Secrets. Although the narrator describes Gamaliel’s 
Book as a place where “he would put everything he could draw from his memory and 
from his soul” the name suggests, that even when a witness desires to bear all, the secret 
still separates them from the meaning they wish to disclose even to themselves (24). 
However, what is at stake is not the “truth” of a story but the act of telling. For Gamaliel, 
writing The Book of Secrets, “made him forget all his frustrations” (24). Therefore, 
although Gamaliel is aware that his Book is cloaked in secrecy he still considers the act of 
telling, through writing, a positive experience. Gamaliel’s Book, although not written as a 
memoir, can be juxtaposed to his ghostwriting stories to suggest that even when writing 
from “memory” and from the “soul,” the secret still remains. However this does not 
suggest that the act of telling or bearing witness as testimony is useless. If the aim is not 
to reveal “truth” but instead to accept that arriving at “truth” is impossible, the act of 
bearing witness as testimony can be understood to exist beyond metaphysical restrictions, 
to instead create a multifaceted experience of memory, perception, and connection.  
 As such, excerpts from Gamaliel’s personal narrative, The Book of Secrets, 
occasionally interrupt the novel. The first excerpt begins with an Archbishop’s search for 
the right word: “Feverishly, he is searching for the first word he’ll speak, the one crucial 
word that will convince the Pope of his humility and his obedience. He cannot find that 
word” (9). Like Gamaliel, the Archbishop acknowledges the complexities of language. 
He is hoping to be understood and to project his compassion in a single word that can 
personify “truth,” but he cannot find it.  The inability to find a word that can explain is a 
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reoccurring theme in the novel. For Gamaliel, who is described as being “fascinated by 
words, by the silence within a word, to which that word gives meaning,” language is 
already detached from the very notion of “truth” (226). Despite his metaphysical desire to 
overcome this fact, Gamaliel’s realization “that to read two words, two little words, was 
as serious an action as the joining of two people. For the distance that separates one word 
from another is, in the world of worlds, as great a distance from earth to a star,” indicates 
that he is already privy to the impossible relationship between witnessing and “truth” 
(226). Coincidently, in the afterword to Obliged by Memory, Wiesel intones a similar 
opinion,  “Have I sufficiently emphasized my doubts on our capacity to transmit what we 
have endured or received, memories of fear and fire, in words, just in words? […] The 
duty to tell the tale is a powerful element in my life; but so is the realization that it cannot 
be told” (157). Here, Wiesel encapsulates the imperative and the paradox of witnessing. 
Although we know that words cannot reveal without concealing, we must continue to 
bear witness because it is all we can do. Wiesel seems to carry this belief to the character 
Gamaliel. Gamaliel’s constant identification of the impossibility of transparency does not 
deter him from telling, instead, he reveals “the secret as secret,” bearing witness while 
acknowledging the incompleteness of his testimony (ibid.).  Thus, when the narrator 
concludes that Gamaliel’s novel which intended  “to illustrate or even justify what he had 
truly intended to make of his life… would never be completed,” he suggests that 
Gamaliel has accepted the necessity for incompleteness and ambiguity (296). Therefore, 
by writing The Book of Secrets, Gamaliel proposes what Wiesel so often reminds his 
readers: “There is a secret in every work of art; there is a secret in every tale” (Cargas, 
Wiesel 85).  
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 The Time of the Uprooted unveils Wiesel’s acceptance of the secrecy of language. 
In discussing the imperative to tell, despite the non-transparency of witnessing, Wiesel 
says, “To tell the tale, the writer must after all, use words, but he writes against them, not 
with them; his goal is to convey ‘not experience but at least a certain secret of the 
experience untouched by words’…I believe very much in the words you do not 
say…Sometimes I strike out a sentence if I believe in it too much; I am moving towards 
silence” (Lambert 186). Wiesel’s acceptance of the importance and intransience of 
silence in language is what makes him a witness of value. Through his fiction, he bears 
witness while revealing the secret nature of text. His novels continue to reveal and 
conceal the tragedy that is war and exile. Although The Time of the Uprooted is a 
fictional account of exile and thus is not labeled as a “true” story, it is a story which 
explicates the complexities of testimony and “truth.”  The story reveals to the reader an 
opening: beyond a metaphysical reading of the novel as a story that bears witness to the 
uprooted, the stateless, and the displaced, the novel questions the need for truth and 
transparency in the telling of a story. Through Gamaliel’s acceptance of the secret, the 
novel emphasizes the need to go beyond the desire for wholeness, to instead glorify the 
ashes of the untranslatable. 
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Chapter II: Community, Identity, and Otherness 
“Before I am, I carry. Before being me, I carry the other. I carry you and must do so, I 
owe it to you…I must translate, transfer, transport…the untranslatable in another turn 
even where, translated, it remains untranslatable” (Derrida “Rams” 162).  
 
 In Jean-Luc Nancy’s The Inoperative Community, he suggests, “it is impossible 
for us to lose community” (35). He goes on to discredit and dissect the metaphysical 
implications of community as a sharing of self-enclosed identities within society and 
instead argues, “community, far from being what society has crushed or lost, is what 
happens to us—question, waiting, event, imperative—in the wake of society” (11). Ian 
James further comments in The Fragmentary Demand: 
Community is not and never has been possible on the basis of an intimate 
and totalized sharing of an essence or identity, which might then be lost, 
ruptured, or dispersed and that we might long to regain. Rather community 
is possible, in the first instance and on a primordial level, only as a kind 
rupturing or dispersion, which is itself constitutive of the sharing of 
communication proper to the being-in-common of the communal. The 
experience of rupture or dispersal, that is, the separation of those entities 
which are “in-common” in community, would be, according to this 
account, precisely that which allows them to be exposed to each other, to 
communicate and to share an existence. (175-176) 
In other words, community happens as an event of being and at the brink of otherness. 
Before we can understand what Nancy suggests when he says, “community…is what 
happens to us,” we must first comprehend the overlap of being, world, and language 
(ibid.). These three terms cannot be understood separately and cannot be divided, but 
  
 
32
instead must be understood as combined—all three parts functioning equally together—in 
order for existence to happen. To simplify this further, before self-reflexivity can occur 
there is the overlap of language, world, and being. Considering the implication that 
without language our understanding of world cannot develop, and until we are able to 
understand world and communicate to an-other we cannot exist as human beings; the 
overlap indicates that a community happens through language and through our 
connection to the Other. Community in this regard is elemental to being; without the 
overlap of language, being, and world existence is impossible. It can also be argued that 
being, as such, is being-with. Since community (which indicates a connection to others 
through language) is a necessity for existence to occur, community, or being-with, can 
never be lost; in order for one to exist there must be community. Therefore, the 
community which Nancy and Ian James describes “happens to us,” cannot be lost in the 
scope of society, or from being uprooted from one country to the next, and cannot be 
understood in metaphysical terms such as “identity” and “society,” but instead indicates 
the inability to separate being, world, and language from the onset of our own existence.  
To clarify a bit further, Nancy’s conception of community emphasizes a non-
communing connection and exposure to the Other that is absolutely necessary for our 
perception of world and our existence to happen. His community differs greatly from the 
metaphysical concept of “community” which defines itself through the similarities and 
customs of certain types of people, necessarily "individuals." Instead, the community 
which exists at the primordial level is that which connects all humans to one another, and 
without it, we cannot exist as human beings—develop our perceptions, our relationships, 
our understanding of similarities and differences, or our individual “identities.” For 
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Nancy, community exists as the basis of our existence. However, because community 
happens through and within language and as an ex-posure to the Other, (which is 
necessarily of difference and thus non-identity, non-unity, or oneness), it also carries a 
separation, a secret, or a gap in meaning which indicates that meaning can never be fully 
transferred to others and even to ourselves. Consequently, even our own thoughts are 
subjected to a separation or a difference from themselves.  James argues that this 
“separation” is what allows for communication and a shared existence at the primordial 
level to exist. He suggests that community needs being as différance to happen. 
Therefore, Nancy’s description of community along with the necessity of difference 
works to illuminate the radical need for the Other and simultaneously the impossibility of 
ever losing community in this sense.  
The importance of a connection with others is a prominent theme in the writings 
of Elie Wiesel. Like many writers of Holocaust Literature, Wiesel deals with these issues 
from a metaphysical standpoint. However, his consistent claim that the connection 
between people is essential can be argued to simultaneously and paradoxically emphasize 
the need for the Other in the non-metaphysical sense insofar as, Wiesel searches for his 
“identity” and desires “wholeness” while still accepting the need for the Other and 
acknowledging the non-transparency of language. In an interview with Harry James 
Cargas, Wiesel argues: 
I formally believed that one must be totally alone to find oneself. I still 
believe so but I believe that even this loneliness, this solitude must be 
within the human condition: to be alone but faced with another person 
being alone. Then you can find out. If you face someone, your child or 
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your wife or your friend, then you can find out who you are; but the other 
one is essential, indispensable. (102) 
Wiesel’s statement “the other one is essential, indispensable,” suggests the importance of 
the Other in order to know the self, and thus reinforces the validity of Nancy’s perception 
of community. Additionally, it acknowledges the imperative of the sharing of testimony. 
As often as Wiesel’s novels discuss an exile’s search for “identity” and “meaning” they 
also reinforce the importance of language—regardless of its incompleteness—as a 
connection to others. Wiesel’s novel, The Time of the Uprooted, read through this lens, 
unveils the impossibilities of isolation due to the primordial need for the Other, and the 
importance of giving testimony to build a community that fosters remembrance through 
narrative and storytelling.  
The purpose of applying this concept to Wiesel’s The Time of the Uprooted is not 
to discredit the feelings of exile, displacement, and homelessness of the characters and 
victims of the Holocaust, but to make apparent that community is still present regardless 
of these emotions. Nancy argues that although, “the concentration camp—and the 
extermination camp—is in essence the will to destroy community… undoubtedly, 
community never entirely ceases” (Nancy, Inoperative 35). Therefore, when Gamaliel 
discovers “everything happens in this world because of encounters,” we witness that his 
feelings of indebtedness to the Other, and his search for meaning, allows him to discover, 
“There is no meaning if meaning is not shared…because meaning itself is a sharing of 
being” (Wiesel, Time 95; Nancy, Being 2).  
In the novel, the narrator introduces Gamaliel as “the eternal stranger protecting 
his secret, as he heads toward a silent building for forgotten people” (10). Shortly after, 
  
 
35
the narrator says, “Let’s note here that Gamaliel, the stranger in this story, isn’t really a 
stranger. Like everyone else, he has an identity: He has an address, friends, connections, 
habits, and yes, he has his quirks and whims. But the refugee in him is always on the 
alert, ready to speak the word that will upset all that he’s taken for granted about the way 
he lives” (11). As previously discussed in chapter one, Gamaliel’s role as “stranger” 
exemplifies his feelings of distance and isolation from himself and to others by alluding 
to the inability to ever fully relate or fully perceive through language. His metaphorical 
journey to a “silent building for forgotten people” indicates that Gamaliel is aware of the 
impossibility of recuperating metaphysical “wholeness.” The words “silent” and 
“forgotten” personify an un-recuperable, untranslatable destination and by saying he is 
travelling towards a community of silence, Gamaliel emphasizes the finitude of his 
search. His paradoxical longing, yet acknowledgement of the impossibility of reaching 
what he longs for establishes my primary contention; Gamaliel, who ultimately desires 
“community” in a metaphysical sense, simultaneously ruptures the possibility of such a 
community by accepting his role as “refugee” or “stranger.”   
Although Gamaliel accepts the impossibility of reestablishing what he has lost, he 
does not stop searching. His longing for “wholeness,” or for what he remembers as 
“home” is ultimately that which Nancy considers a false idea of “community” and 
“identity,” and that which causes most of Gamaliel’s uncertainty and anxiety within the 
novel. For Nancy, “community” in a metaphysical sense cannot exist—it would mean 
death. To clarify this, metaphysical “community” is one which claims individuality and 
identity as immanence, and thus radically negates the finitude constitutive of community. 
Nancy argues: 
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Immanence, communal fusion, contains no other logic than that of the 
suicide of the community that is governed by it… The fully realized 
person of individualistic or communistic humanism is the dead person. In 
other words, death, in such a community, is not the unmasterable excess of 
finitude, but the infinite fulfillment of an immanent life. (Inoperative 12-
13).  
Death then comes to signify a denial of finitude and, instead, represents a “community” 
which longs for “pure immanence.” Incidentally, Nancy uses Nazi Germany as an 
example to suggest that the logic used to exterminate the “other” (those deemed as 
subhuman or those who did not “satisfy the criteria of pure immanence”) emphasizes the 
impossibility of a community which is pure and proves that “The German nation 
itself…represent[s] a plausible extrapolation of the process” (12). The process here 
signifies the outcome of a community of death (one that seeks the fulfillment of 
immanence) as ultimately attempting suicide. Gamaliel, through his search for 
“wholeness” then, can be argued as searching for a non-existent identity based upon a 
metaphysical world of final signifiers. To simplify, “wholeness” which indicates the 
ability to be complete, denies the “separation” which James’ argues is a necessity for “the 
sharing of existence” that is Nancian community (ibid.). However, although the novel 
emphasizes Gamaliel’s metaphysical desire for “wholeness,” that is, a recuperation of his 
allegedly lost “identity” and sense of “community,” it also thematizes his realization of 
the incompleteness and impossibility of ever reaching this “wholeness.” For my 
purposes, Gamaliel’s paradoxical search for wholeness alongside his slow acceptance of 
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the inability of re-cuperation exposes the separation intrinsic to language and being, and 
suggests the indestructible movement of the communal at the primordial level.  
Gamaliel’s initial acceptance of the impossibility of finding his lost identity is 
presented through a reflection of his statelessness: “a refugee is a different kind of being, 
one from whom all that defines a normal person has been amputated. He belongs to no 
nation, is welcome at no one’s table. A leper. He can achieve nothing unless others help 
him” (Wiesel, Time 170). Gamaliel’s realization, based on the metaphysical assumption 
that “normal people” or those who have not experienced traumatic events (of 
uprootedness or exile) are indeed “whole” (rather than amputated), suggests that he is 
indeed feeling a loss of  “community” and “identity” in a metaphysical sense. However, 
within his longings for the metaphysical, simultaneously coexisting, are Gamaliel’s 
feelings of strangeness or isolation (such as a leper would feel), signifying his 
acknowledgement of his otherness, or finitude. Furthermore, Gamaliel admits that 
without “others [to] help him” he can “achieve nothing,” suggesting that not only is he 
aware of his finitude, but of the need for the Other, or being-with, which is necessary for 
existence (ibid.) Through a philosophical discourse these longings suggest the 
acknowledgement of a more profound connection and simultaneous separation at the 
basis of existence.  
Therein, what must be addressed once more is the vast difference between 
Gamaliel’s metaphysical understanding of “community” and “identity,” which relies on 
social relations and cultural similarities, from Nancian community, which cannot be lost 
because it coincides with being itself. Nancy articulates: 
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Nothing…has been lost, and for this reason nothing is lost. We alone are 
lost, we upon whom the ‘social bond’ (relations, communication), our own 
invention, now descends heavily like the net of an economic, technical, 
political, and cultural snare. Entangled in its meshes, we have wrung for 
ourselves the phantasms of the lost community. (Inoperative 11-12)  
Nancy suggests metaphysical longings such as that of a “lost community” are in fact 
caused by our own invention, and thus it is us who are truly lost, not community. In the 
novel, Gamaliel spends much time recounting his three failed relationships and his lack 
of communication with his twin daughters to suggest that his loss of self, his loss of 
“community” is the cause of his inability to form lasting ties with these women. But 
accepting the impossibility of a metaphysical “community” leaves us to question: If 
Gamaliel’s loss of “identity” is not the cause of his failure to build relationships, what is? 
If we accept metaphysical community is death, we can argue that Gamaliel is mistaking 
or misreading his trauma (his statelessness, uprootedness and feelings of exile) as a loss 
of “community,” when in fact, the impossibility of transparency is what causes his 
feelings of “loss.” Nancy suggest, “What this community has “lost”—the immanence and 
the intimacy of a communion—is lost only in the sense that such a “loss” is constitutive 
of “community” itself” (12). His argument implies that “loss” is inherent to community. 
Therefore, Gamaliel has not truly “lost” community, but instead is feeling the effects of 
his realization that there is always a “loss” in community. Gamaliel does not succeed in 
relating to others or to himself because he is trying to find his “identity.” His search for a 
“real self,” which he believes is necessary in order to connect with others, is ultimately 
what causes his stagnation. What Gamaliel is feeling—isolation from his daughters, his 
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ex-wives, and even to a certain extent from himself—are not in fact caused by his desire 
for a metaphysical “wholeness,” but instead indicates Gamaliel’s slow realization that 
there can never be transparency; in order for community, or for a relation to the Other to 
exist, there must be separation.  
Gamaliel’s “community” within the novel is described as comprised of four 
friends with similar stories of exile and past struggles. He tells us there is “Bolek with his 
secret, Diego with his stories of the Spanish Civil War, Yasha with his cat, [and] Gad 
with his adventures” (Time 15).  These four friends, often the addressees of Gamaliel’s 
witnessing, support him in times of melancholy and confusion, becoming pillars of 
communal, shared experiences. Early in the novel, the narrator discloses that Gamaliel 
seeks the company of these four in times of worry, wishing he could be “listening to their 
voices, proving himself worthy of their confidences but never judging them, adding his 
exile’s testimony to theirs” (15). Gamaliel’s desire for a strong relationship with these 
four friends uncovers his desire to build “community” and redefine his loss of “identity” 
in the wake of exile. However, at the same time, Gamaliel understands the impossibility 
of reaching his goal. He emphasizes the need “for others to help him” which indicates 
that he is already aware that community cannot be lost (because he needs or depends on 
the Other), and by accepting his metaphorical and literal role as “refugee” he alludes to 
the separation or otherness, which in a metaphysical sense is problematic, but non-
metaphysically, is necessary (ibid.). Although within the novel it seems as if Gamaliel 
searches for a metaphysical sense of connection among fellow exiles, his quest to “add 
his testimony to theirs” and his continual struggle with language as a medium for 
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transparency, reveals a dual imperative—both metaphysical and non-metaphysical—
simultaneously, paradoxically coexisting.  
Furthermore, because language is a response to the Other, and all language is 
bound by différance, there is always an imperative to tell. In other words, despite the 
incompleteness of language, our infinite need to tell bounds us to the Other, and thus we 
are always in community. Gamaliel’s imperative to tell can be understood in two ways: 
The first being a “provable” imperative—one that can be explained by Gamaliel’s desire 
for social acceptance and empathy from those he believes can fully understand his 
struggles. The second is a “non-provable” imperative that recognizes the impossibility of 
the first, but also understands the need for it.  Let us step back a moment and recall 
Derrida’s theory of différance.  Because of the constant deferral of meaning in language, 
it is impossible to present a “provable” testimony or a “truth.” We have already seen that 
Gamaliel understands the limits of language (“limited” because he is thinking 
metaphysically) as he is often depicted as struggling with finding the words to tell and to 
create a testimony which can fully transcribe his own witnessing. Furthermore, Gamaliel 
is portrayed as a ghostwriter, both metaphorically and literally—he writes under the 
names of others, and when he writes his own stories they are labeled as Secrets. Through 
this layering of authorship, the reader can identify Gamaliel’s imperative to tell as being 
more accurately “non-provable”—he bears witness attempting to re-build community, 
knowing that he must, yet knowing that he can never fully reveal all, even to himself.  
Thus, Gamaliel’s imperative to create a community and add “his testimony to theirs 
[Bolek, Yasha, Gad and Diego]” becomes a duty that is essentially finite, or one, which 
simultaneously denies the possibility of ever being fulfilled (ibid.). As such, the 
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imperative, instead of proving, shows; it acknowledges an unknowable, improvable 
secret—a separation.   
The necessity or imperative of building testimonies alongside one another, 
functions through différance. In Nancy’s essay, “The Free Voice of Man,” he argues, 
“Duty belongs, in effect, to the structure of finitude,” and thus “difference brings forth 
duty by itself” (40-46). In other words, because différance is finite (we are never able to 
overcome the gaps within meaning and the thing itself), the duty to tell, or the imperative 
to do so, is equally finite—never can the act of telling and bearing witness fully 
transcribe an event or experience—yet we must continue to tell because there is no other 
way. Wiesel discusses his duty to give testimony while knowing that it cannot provide 
proof by saying, “What matters is to struggle against silence with words…What matters 
is to gather a smile here and there, a tear here and there, a word here and there…” (Why I 
Write 21). Wiesel’s “struggle against silence” indicates that although he recognizes that 
language is finite, he understands the duty and imperative described by Nancy. Wiesel, 
like all beings, has an “un-reasonable necessity without reason, a demonstration without 
proof, an‘Il faut’ an ‘It is necessary’” to tell (Free-Voice 37). He, like so many, tells 
stories to pass on memories, as well as to share and listen to the stories of others—to 
build community, because he must, because it is necessary to do so.  
Within the novel, Gamaliel continually draws attention to the necessity of telling. 
He quotes the words of a Rebbe, “you and I are here only to bear witness” as a way to 
glorify the act of telling, despite its non-transparency (151). In one such scene, Gamaliel 
stresses the importance of bearing witness to Bolek, who is described previously as 
having a “secret” because of his unwillingness to share or tell of his own experiences 
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until now. To fully understand the importance of this scene it is necessary to review what 
Bolek bears witness to: After going into hiding with his family, Bolek would occasionally 
leave at night to acquire food just outside the ghettos. One night while out in search of 
something to eat, Bolek returns to see the ghetto surrounded by German soldiers and 
Polish police. His parents and siblings were discovered, as Bolek, on the outskirts of the 
ghetto, watched plagued with guilt and shame. Years later after discovering the culprit 
who betrayed his parents and so many others, Bolek sought vengeance upon him. The 
traitor was a son of a very proud Jewish father who dedicated himself to the resistance. 
Although the father pled mercy for his son, Bolek, along with other officials, sentenced 
the son to death. Although Bolek bears witness to these memories, perhaps to clear his 
conscience, he knows full well that the past cannot be resolved and that his act of telling 
can never fully reveal the experiences that he witnessed. However, Bolek’s response to 
Gamaliel’s question, “Why don’t you write about what you went through back then? 
Don’t you think it’s your duty to pay homage to what your comrades did? For the sake of 
history…” suggests Bolek is much less willing to accept the limitations of language than 
Gamaliel (200). Bolek responds with a lengthy diatribe against history: 
Don’t talk to me about history. Some believe in it, and others will go so 
far as to sacrifice their conscience to make it say what they want, for lack 
of the truth. As for me, I don’t believe in it. History is murderous, and as 
set as the blank face you’d see on a hardened killer. I’ve heard it said that 
now we know everything about the Holocaust, that it’s been picked apart, 
analyzed, demystified, that all its parts have been dismantled. Such is the 
arrogance of ignorance! They accumulate data drawn from the official 
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German archives without realizing that the truth isn’t found only in 
numbers, dates, and orders. Who knows about my father’s heroic dying, 
my mother’s silent tears? Where is their truth? (Wiesel, Time 200)  
Bolek’s dislike for history is further explained by his contempt at the supposed 
demystification of the Holocaust. He argues that “They,” or historians, miss the truth of 
the victims, “We seem to know the murderers better than the victims. And they call that 
serving history. Well, Their history isn’t my history, because my truth isn’t their truth!” 
(200). Gamaliel uses Bolek’s argument against history to further suggest that Bolek’s 
apprehension to bear witness is, in fact, the reason he should tell, to add his story to the 
“truth” presented in History. 
Bolek’s act of bearing witness exemplifies two important aspects of the act of 
witnessing that he fails to understand. First, Bolek, who thinks solely in metaphysical 
terms, misunderstands the need to tell to an Other and the effects such a witnessing can 
have on history. Bolek falsely assumes that the only purpose bearing witness serves is to 
bridge the gaps in society found between victims and historians, or more acutely, 
between the witness and addressee. However, Bolek overlooks the necessity of the gap. 
He wants his witnessing to fully explicate his experiences and because he knows this is 
impossible, he argues against writing, against bearing witness. He overlooks the 
unbridgeable distance that is necessary and irrevocable in communication and 
community. Derrida argues, “I can address the Other only to the extent that there is a 
separation, a dissociation, so that I cannot replace the other and vice versa… I cannot 
reach the other. I cannot know the other from the inside and so on. That is not an obstacle 
but the condition of love, friendship, and of war, too, a condition of the relation to the 
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other” (Caputo, Derrida 14). Derrida further suggests that this disassociation is the 
“condition of community” and without it community is not possible (ibid.). Secondly, 
Bolek’s reaction to Gamaliel’s questions suggests that he has not accepted the imperative 
that derives from différance—the difference that creates our obligation to tell. Nancy 
argues,  “différance (if it has anything) has the structure and nature of an obligation...” 
and thus, “… still remains within the sphere of finitude” (Free Voice 46-47).  In other 
words, finitude creates the imperative and compels us to bear witness. Every word 
spoken is a response to the Other and thus becomes a testimony—never fully translatable, 
always separated from “truth,” yet this is all we can do: bear witness and communicate to 
the Other. So, although Bolek describes his problems with capital H- History, which 
suggest that History is Truth and can be proven through “facts,” Gamaliel reminds Bolek 
of the importance of “adding testimony” to a growing collective.  
Wiesel often argues that the role of the witness is not to distinguish truth from 
falsity, but to add to an ever-growing multiplicity of accounts that together form a 
community of remembrance. Using Wiesel’s argument, Bolek’s previous silence, until 
his act of witnessing to Gamaliel, can be read as a struggle to accept finitude and thus, 
accept that the duty to tell exists in the realm of the finite, insofar as Bolek’s fear that his 
testimony would be misunderstood and the “truth” would not be communicated causes 
him to refrain from telling, despite his desire to do so. Bolek is purposefully juxtaposed 
to Gamaliel who, like Wiesel, knows the problems a witness faces, “[Gamaliel] often 
wondered what means of speech would be decent, honorable, and effective enough for 
him to testify on behalf of his dead parents. A prayer, or a Howl? Or perhaps silence?” 
(Wiesel, Time 201). However, Gamaliel’s reluctance to use words alone to communicate 
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the horrors of his loss does not stop him from telling stories; he continues to write, to tell, 
because there is no other recourse. For that reason, the reader can infer that through 
Bolek’s act of telling, unwillingly though it might have been, he finally accepts his 
obligation to tell despite, and to a certain extent, “because of” its limits.  
Ironically, despite Bolek’s apprehensions to accept his obligations, it is he who 
introduces Gamaliel to Georges Lebrun and encourages Gamaliel to accept Lebrun’s 
offer of becoming his ghostwriter. When Gamaliel declares, “I’ll never write for someone 
who’s such an imbecile and a bad-mannered one besides,” Bolek responds assertively, 
“What if by accident you were to write a good book…Then either no one reads your 
masterpiece, in which case it doesn’t exist, or else it’s published, not under your name, 
but it exists” (Wiesel, Time 23). Bolek’s logic convinces Gamaliel to take the job. Wiesel, 
who often speaks of the fight against silence, would agree with Bolek that the story must 
be told; it must exist, and not be forgotten. Therefore, Gamaliel’s role as ghostwriter, read 
metaphorically, illuminates the role of the witness within community. The witness in 
seeking an “identity” will soon realize that identity must and can only exist if it is shared 
(and thus not an “identity” at all).  And although Gamaliel writes under the names of 
others, he continues to write. Through accepting the impossibility of finding the right 
word to explain (and to identify him), his search for an individual “identity” becomes 
null. Instead, Gamaliel begins to understand how his finitude is that which connects him 
to others.  
For a moment let us return to Nancy’s idea of community, which suggests “Death 
is indissociable from community” (Inoperative 14).  To further explain how community 
and death are connected Nancy suggests, “Community is revealed in the death of others” 
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(15). What this means exactly is that community is ultimately a presentation of finitude, 
or mortal truth. However, this does not suggest that death can be seen as a link to a 
communal essence or principle of identity. Nancy argues: 
Community…is calibrated on the death of those whom we call, perhaps 
wrongly, its “members” (inasmuch as it is not a question of an organism). 
But it does not make a work of this calibration. The death upon which 
community is calibrated does not operate the dead being’s passage into 
some communal intimacy, nor does community, for its part, operate the 
transfiguration of its dead into some substance or subject…community is 
calibrated on death as that of which it is precisely impossible to make a 
work. (Inoperative 14-15) 
The inoperable nature of death and thus community can be further understood by 
considering how death is the only place wherein one can be fully realized. However, the 
dead cannot know they are dead, only the community left behind can acknowledge the 
death of the “I” or the “individual.” This cycle indicates a radical rupture of the 
possibility for the “individual” to exist within community. Instead, as Ian James clarifies, 
“It is seeing others die, and in our participation in that same potentiality for (or being-
toward) death, that we encounter our own finitude…it is on the basis of the fact that our 
mortality or finitude is always already shared that something like community can exist” 
(James 180). Therefore, in the scene previously described, when Bolek witnesses the 
young Jewish traitor’s death, it can be argued that he recognizes his own finitude and in 
sharing this experience through bearing witness to Gamaliel, he is emphasizing the 
connection further between death and community. Moreover, James explains “Since 
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death, as the annihilation of subjectivity, is only ever encountered indirectly in the death 
of others, it is not something that is assimilable to the principle of identity, or, in Nancy’s 
words, to the ‘resources of a metaphysics of the subject’” (James 181). In other words, 
because death can never be experienced directly (because the only one who can 
experience death directly is the departed), and because death is the only instance where 
full realization can occur, a self-actualized “identity” within community is impossible. 
Through his witnessing of the traitor’s death and his desire to share this experience with 
Gamaliel, we can argue that Bolek acknowledges that death cannot be isolated from 
community because it is our finitude or mortality (which is always shared) that allows for 
a community to exist.   
Gamaliel emphasizes the impossibility for an individual identity within 
community when he reveals his own feelings on death’s looming presence. For Gamaliel, 
“death was once a stranger to him, then it became a neutral onlooker” (Wiesel, Time 91). 
His relationship to death, or as he personifies it, “The Angel of Death,” is described as 
gaining control of him, and saying, “You say ‘I’? Don’t you know that in a blink of an 
eye I can erase that word from your vocabulary forever?” (91). This metaphorical 
relationship to Death mirrors what Nancy argues in The Inoperative Community.  The 
mention of “I” here can be used to indicate death as the only instance of full self-
actualization, or self-identity and thus, when death argues that “He” can erase the word 
“I” forever, Death is instructing Gamaliel to recognize his own finitude (ibid.).  
Simultaneously, Gamaliel comes to acknowledge that a metaphysical community that 
claims “I’s” or individuals can exist in isolation is actually a community working in 
cahoots with death, insofar as community, which seeks and claims immanence, is death. 
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Nancy states, “Death itself is the true community of I’s that are not egos. It is not a 
communion that fuses the egos into an Ego or a higher We. It is the community of others” 
(Inoperative 15). What he means here is that death is the only place where the ‘I’ can 
exist, thus community, which is dependent on the relation to the Other, “is the 
presentation of the finitude and the irredeemable excess that make up finite being” (15).  
Later in the novel, when Gamaliel ponders death and discusses it with his mentor 
Rebbe Zusya, Gamaliel argues that he does not fear the loss of ‘I’ for he has lost his 
“nationality” and “identity” already as a refugee (Time 91). Gamaliel’s fearlessness 
indicates that although he acknowledges that death is the only event that can present and 
simultaneously extinguish an “individual” within community, he feels partially “lost” 
already. This scene exemplifies the paradoxical coexistence of the metaphysical and non-
metaphysical at play in the novel. Although Gamaliel describes a loss of “identity” and 
“nationality” (both metaphysical concepts), the Rebbe’s response, “In a sense, but in one 
sense only, we are all men without a country,” reminds us of the impossibility of such 
metaphysical terms (Wiesel, Time 91). The conversation with the Rebbe, read through a 
philosophical lens, suggests the impossibility of a metaphysical identity. The Rebbe’s 
phrase “we are all men without a country” reminds Gamaliel that whether one has been 
exiled or uprooted from their “homes” there is still a community “unified” by finitude, 
the quality that makes us all strangers even to ourselves (ibid.). These two paradoxical 
themes, the desire for the recuperation of a metaphysical community alongside the 
acceptance of our inherent otherness, which connects us to all other beings, are 
simultaneously presented through Gamaliel’s internal struggles. However, through the 
course of the novel, Gamaliel slowly acknowledges and embraces his own otherness and 
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the necessity of the Other, realizing that his own desire for metaphysical “wholeness” is 
in fact the cause of his inability to accept and recover from his traumatic experiences.  
The Time of the Uprooted, read along side the theories of Jean Luc Nancy, Ian 
James and Jacques Derrida, should not be considered an attack on the longing for a 
metaphysical sense of identity and the ethical imperative to build a “community” based 
on shared experiences, but should instead create an opening of perception and 
interpretation that creates a larger understanding of our unbreakable ties to the Other, 
along with our obligation or imperative to bear witness in spite of the incompleteness of 
all testimony. Being is ultimately being-with and this rationalization should prompt a 
reading of Wiesel’s novel that reveals the levels of existence present (those at the 
primordial level, and those of the material world of metaphysics). Although Gamaliel will 
never find all that he has lost (primarily his sense of “home” and “belonging”), he 
resolves, on the final pages of the novel, to “Begin again” and reminds us that community 
is a presentation of “its death, but also of its birth” (Wiesel, Time 300; Inoperative 15).  
Gamaliel must accept that it is impossible to cross over to death (insofar as there can be 
no ‘I’ in death), but instead he must “begin again” in the wake of his otherness, and his 
acceptance of finitude (ibid.).  
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Chapter III: Conclusion--Bearing Witness and History  
Nancy Goodman, psychoanalyst of Holocaust trauma suggests, “Without 
witnessing, the most terrible of events can remain untold, leaving a place of negation and 
‘nothing’ in the mind and in the historic record” (3).  She goes on to describe the density 
of trauma as an impenetrable space, a “dead space,” a “place of nonexistence” which she 
argues, through witnessing can become “an opening, a new space” where “growth and 
fertilization of mind with narrative” can take place (5-6). Although the “space” which 
Goodman discusses may differ from the space caused by différance, she nevertheless 
acknowledges “a space within the mind and [a] space between people” during the process 
of witnessing (4).  This space, which for our purposes has more to do with language and 
less to do with trauma, emphasizes the distance a witness feels from their memories. For 
Holocaust survivors, this space is indicative of their complete inability to describe the 
horrors they witnessed to those who were not there, and therefore could not possibly 
understand. However, underneath the trauma of such a witnessing lies the peculiar 
movement of language—always positing while simultaneously withdrawing meaning. 
How then do we use language to find meaning and lessen “the dead space” without 
dishonoring the dead? 
 Goodman sees “the type of space created by witnessing to be where description, 
metaphor, and reflection arise” and goes on to agree that, “we need to resort to metaphor 
when attempting to knit together meaning” (5). Here Goodman conveys a Derridian sense 
of responsibility. In “Poetics and Politics of Witnessing,” Derrida asserts, “all responsible 
witnessing engages a poetic experience of language” (66).  What Derrida means here is 
that through the use of the poetic (figurative language) the witness can avoid claiming 
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that something “is” and instead is able to suggest what something is “like” or similar to. 
This seemingly small detail allows for a more responsible witnessing insofar as the 
witness is never claiming to know, in certitude, but to think. Thus, the use of the poetic 
acknowledges that it is impossible to ever re-present fully. As such, despite the 
demystification of the metaphysical concepts of community and identity, can a 
“responsible” bearing witness be viewed as cathartic and recuperative? And if so, can a 
witness account, which has been “proven” to be “un-provable,” still create a fuller 
understanding of a historical event?  
The Time of the Uprooted touches upon these questions through a responsible 
poetic. Although Wiesel does not use poetry per-se his use of metaphor and his unveiling 
of, as Derrida describes, “the mask as mask” is beneficial in unraveling our posed 
questions (Poetics 68). The mask here refers to the novel’s constant questioning of the 
effectiveness of bearing witness through language, which of course is the only possible 
way to do so. When the narrator in the novel recalls Gamaliel’s conversation with an old 
man who shares his concerns with language, the old man says, “Every word has its 
double, as does man: This double accompanies man, or denies him; it is always the 
aggressor. It distorts the reality that the word transmits. But where is truth...If that word is 
telling a lie, is man up to the task of discovering the truth…But then again, what is a lie? 
The opposite of the truth? But then what is truth?” (Wiesel, Time 69). These ponderous 
questions reveal the mask, or for the sake of clarity, the unknowable, unanswerable secret 
in language. As the man suggests, a word’s “double…distorts the reality that the word 
transmits” causing “truth” to be read as a perception (ibid.). Revealing (bearing witness), 
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while simultaneously concealing (suggesting the incompleteness of testimony) creates a 
poetic, and thus a responsible witnessing.  
The unveiling of the mask is a common motif in Wiesel’s writing. In his essay, 
“Why I Write,” Wiesel ponders, “What does exiled language mean? It refers to the 
distance between words and what they mask. It signifies the tension between language 
and its subject” (31). For our purposes, Wiesel’s use of the word “mask” emphasizes his 
acceptance of the necessary “limits” of bearing witness. These “limits” can be understood 
as the witness’ realization of the impossibility of fully explaining, or proving the events 
of the Holocaust. Wiesel understands language, always in exile, is masked from what it 
intends to mean; language can never fully present an event to an Other or even to the 
witness themselves (because an event can only be experienced through language and thus 
always carries différance). However, his constant emphasis on bearing witness regardless 
of these “limitations” is his most well known quality as a writer of Holocaust literature. 
Wiesel frequently uses the predicament of the witness in the characters of his novels. 
Gamaliel for instance, often remembers the words of mentors, madmen, and sage’s. In 
one such scene he remembers the words of a Rebbe who says, “to be silent is forbidden; 
to speak is impossible” (Time 130).  In other words, although speaking or bearing witness 
to the Holocaust is impossible, insofar as the witness can never find the words to 
transcribe the event to an outsider (or to themselves), silence must be forbidden. To not 
speak would be a crime against history and humanity. Wiesel’s emphasis is to encourage 
the act of bearing witness as an obligation to history, for those who did not survive the 
camps. However, this obligation leaves us to contemplate:  can we bear witness for the 
dead?  
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This question is explored within the novel as well. In the same scene as that noted 
above, the old man asks: “How about the conquered? Who speaks for them, for those 
who learned only to howl?” echoing the question so many who survived the Holocaust 
are prone to ask (Time 69). Who bears witness for the dead?  Derrida emphasizes this 
through his reading of Celan’s poem which contains a line that translates loosely to: “No 
one/ bears witness for the /witness” (Poetics 75). In other words, only the witness of an 
event can bear witness to that particular experience, no one can take his or her place as 
witness.  If this is so, how can we ever gain a fully articulated truth about an event 
plagued with “conquered” witnesses? Those who remain, those who survived and bear 
witness to the deaths of so many “conquered” victims then, can only bear witness to 
(their own experiences), and not for (the experiences of the dead). Even Wiesel in his 
Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech agrees, “No one may speak for the dead, no one 
may interpret their mutilated dreams and visions” (1986). Therefore, should we consider 
the testimony of survivors, which is incomplete, valuable to history? Derrida responds to 
this by saying, “We should ask for what necessary—not accidental—reasons the sense of 
‘proof’ regularly comes to contaminate or divert the sense of ‘bearing witness’” (Poetics 
75).  Derrida’s distaste for the word “proof” signifies an understanding of language as an 
un-provable medium. If all words carry a trace or a secret, which can never be shared, 
then all witnessing, by definition, carries a space as well. And it is this space, which 
defies the possibility of certitude or proof in any testimony. But what Derrida stresses by 
suggesting proof is a contaminate to bearing witness is that although un-provable, 
witnessing should not be subjected to such absolutes and it is no accident that it is. If we 
agree with this understanding, bearing witness is not proof but, instead, an unmistakably 
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unique account of an event, then yes, a “non-provable” witnessing can indeed enhance 
our understanding and add to our historical perspective of an event.  After all, no one can 
bear witness in place of the survivors of the Holocaust, their accounts, although not able 
to encompass the witnessing of the dead, are singular. 
The question then is how a collective of witness accounts which are “non-
provable” can be added to History, which claims to be True. Although the possibility of 
capital “T” Truth has already been discussed and disproved within the scope of this 
thesis, traditional historians continue to label History as such. Thus, we are left with a 
fragmented falsely labeled History, alongside a collection of Holocaust literature.  In the 
introduction to A Double Dying Reflections on Holocaust Literature, Alvin Rosenfeld 
discusses the forces working against the witness such as, linguistic incapacity, and reader 
reluctance. He argues the literature that “develop[s] against such extreme countervailing 
forces,” is: 
A literature of fragments, or partial and provisional forms, no one of 
which by itself can suffice to express the Holocaust, but the totality of 
which begins to accumulate and register a coherent and powerful 
effect…the shards and fragments that reveal, in their separateness and 
brokenness, the uncountable small tragedies that together add up to 
something larger than the tragic sense implies. (Rosenfeld 33) 
Although Rosenfeld is not discussing the same problematic qualities of language that we 
discuss, that being the impossibility of meaning to ever be fully shared due to différance, 
he does stress the incompleteness of one witness account, and emphasizes the need for 
multiple accounts of the same event that together build a more comprehensive 
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recollection of a historical event. Thus it is up to readers, or the addressees, to collect 
these witness accounts and build their understanding of an event or experience, which 
History fails to fully transcribe. In speaking of the Holocaust specifically, Wiesel says, 
“in a deeper sense it is beyond history. That means it’s an Event, as we always say with a 
capital e, where whatever happened went beyond whatever happened” (Cargas 119). To 
go beyond history, this is why we read stories about the Holocaust, study testimonies, and 
memoirs, not to disvalue History as such, but to add to it and to surpass the limits that 
History as such creates.  
 Let us return for a moment to Goodman’s theory of “the place of non-existence” 
which the act of witnessing can open, creating “pathways to the edge of the silent or 
actively volcanic abyss” (ibid.). Her metaphor for the impact of trauma on survivors of 
the Holocaust can help to determine the possibilities for recuperation through bearing 
witness. Goodman believes that this metaphoric hole, or dead space, “can breathe just a 
little bit once it has been witnessed and in many ways must also remain as a monument to 
the horror that has transpired” (7). For our purposes, her metaphor works well with 
Derrida’s theory of différance. Goodman asserts that although this hole can “breathe” it 
must “remain” (ibid.). Indicating that a witness can perhaps gain a sense of relief from 
giving testimony, but the deferral and difference that separates all language from 
meaning, and ultimately plagues the witness with an incomplete testimony, can never 
fully alleviate the hole, or space that will always remain. Therefore, can the act of bearing 
witness, on an emotional level, bring solace to the witness? This question cannot be 
answered, but only speculated. For most witnesses, the fulfillment of an obligation is 
enough.  
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 Wiesel’s obligation to bear witness stems from his desire to prevent the Holocaust 
from being forgotten, or even worse, argued to be a fabrication. For Wiesel, “to forget 
would be the enemies final triumph” (Wiesel, From the Kingdom 187). He believes, “No 
one who has not experienced the event will ever be able to understand it. And yet, the 
survivor is conscious of his duty to bear witness. To tell the tale.  To protest every time 
any ‘revisionist,’ morally perverse as he may be, dares deny the death of those who died” 
(ibid.).  His acceptance of his obligation to tell, while still understanding the limitations 
of bearing witness, illuminates the paradox of all witnessing. In Alan Berger essay 
“Transfusing Memory,” featured in Obliged by Memory, Wiesel describes the paradox of 
memory as “our [survivors’] real kingdom” and “a graveyard” indicating that for 
survivors, memory brings a sense of comfort, yet it is a graveyard of translation (119). It 
cannot translate the dead, and even less the experience of the Holocaust. Yet, Wiesel 
argues that his task is to bring his readers and listeners “closer to the gate of memory” 
(120).  Wiesel here emphasizes the impossibility of bringing an addressee to the gate of 
memory; they can only be brought “closer,” yet he believes it is the obligation of the 
witness to do so. The theme of remembrance, despite its ineptitude, is present in all of 
Wiesel’s writing, especially his fictional accounts of exile.  
In Colin Davis’ Elie Wiesel’s Secretive Texts, he suggests that Wiesel commonly 
uses the motif of “illusions and the telling of lies” in many of his novels to alleviate the 
burden of knowing and yet never being able to explain (64). In The Time of the Uprooted, 
Gamaliel’s persistence of bearing witness is the central theme of the novel. However, 
Gamaliel is not deceived by language’s ability to tell. Known as a storyteller among his 
friends and lovers, Gamaliel often puts forth his own fears and trepidations with language 
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through his invented characters, his own “lies.” In one story, an acrobat named Jeremy is 
“convinced he could never break out of the silence that enveloped him inside and out,” 
and later learns, “that life depends on others. If one of them is absentminded, it is you 
who will die” (Wiesel, Time 270).  The stories embedded within the pages of the novel 
create a crucial parallel to Wiesel’s use of characters to suggest his own torments. Thus, 
Gamaliel’s stories become parables, which as readers, we should infer a great deal more 
than what the words claim to mean. In Jeremy’s case, his silence, which he cannot break 
away from, is suggestive of Gamaliel’s own struggles with bearing witness through 
language. Like Wiesel, Gamaliel’s characters seek the stories of others to alleviate the 
incompleteness of witnessing. Therefore, Jeremy’s lesson, “life depends on others,” is 
also useful to understand Gamaliel, who must realize that we bear witness to the other, as 
an obligation, to not allow our stories be absentmindedly forgotten (ibid.).   
Gamaliel bears witness to another story, one told to him by his friend Bolek. 
Bolek’s story tells the tale of a poet and chronicler named Asher Baumgarten. Bolek and 
others in the resistance movement would inform Asher of what was taking place in the 
ghettos in the hopes that he would “bear witness to [their]…suffering and…struggle, for 
History’s sake” (Wiesel, Time 283). Bolek depended on Asher to be “the carrier of 
memory”, but after the Germans collected the last of the children, Asher committed 
suicide (ibid.). The note he left asked for forgiveness for giving up, and said, “I saw the 
children; I witnessed their cries and their tears. And I no longer have the words to tell it” 
(283).  This scene in the novel is vital in understanding Wiesel’s motives for bearing 
witness. Throughout the course of the novel, Gamaliel also considers suicide as an escape 
from memory, but what is more important to understand is that Gamaliel does not give 
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up, nor does he stop telling. By including Asher’s defeat, Wiesel juxtaposes the words of 
a Rebbe, who on his deathbed suggests, “I’m not beaten! I’m still alive. With my last 
gasp, I can change the course of events. Don’t you know that yet? Haven’t I taught you 
anything?” (258). These contrasting ideas suggest that the act of bearing witness for 
Wiesel is crucial and the only means to change the future and prevent it from repeating 
the past. He argues, “It is quite simple: a witness who does not give his or her testimony 
may be considered a false witness” (Wiesel, Obliged, 158). Therefore, Gamaliel’s 
continual attempts to bear witness in the novel, comes to suggest that even if the witness 
claims to “no longer have the words to tell,” the witness must continue attempting to 
bring the listener as close as possible, it is the obligation of the witness (ibid.).  
Through his fiction, Wiesel tells stories layered in narrative voices and poetic 
style to bridge the gap between memory and history, between the survivor and the next 
generation, and although he will never close the gap, he continues to tell, and to try to 
explain. By analyzing Wiesel’s experience with literature and memoir, bearing witness 
surpasses the “individual” and instead cultivates a collective, which adds to history, and 
perhaps exceeds the limitations of it. Through this rationalization, an “un-provable” 
witness account can add to our understanding of a historical event. Furthermore, despite 
the unraveling of the metaphysical aspects of  “identity” and “community,” the act of 
bearing witness can come to represent an act of showing, which when combined with 
other acts of witnessing, reveals the impossibility of a loss of community, the 
misconceptions of “unity” (as a sense of collective sharing of beliefs and culture), and 
instead reveals the need for the Other as a basis for being. Nancy reminds us, “Being 
cannot be anything but being-with-one-another, circulating in the with and as the with of 
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this singularly plural coexistence” (Nancy, Being 3). For Gamaliel and Wiesel, the Other 
is proven to be a necessity, and thus The Time of the Uprooted responsibly bears witness 
to the Other, creating a testimony that does not prove, but reveals that “no one can bear 
witness for the witness” (ibid.). 
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